Marriage-PresumptioDS and Burden of Proof.-When a peraon has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and . the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second 'marriage to prove that the first mnrri:lge had not been dis-• 'Solved by the death of a spouse or by divorce or had not been auulled at the time of the second marriage, an estate proceeding, the evidence supa finding that a ClllimllDt wns the 'trife of th" tcstntor time of his death, where she tcstified thllt she cntrrccl • a marriage ceremony with another m::m in rdiancl\ on a by the testator that he hnd obtained a divorce, the testator's denth she was unable to find nny of a divorce, and that she did not receive any divorce papers or notice of a divorce action from the testator; where there was other evidence that her marriage to the testator . . Jaad not been dissolved by divorce; and where the testator, who was not shown to have married again, bequeathed a sum .,tmoney to his "wife."
BrldeD.C4""':Heaniay·-]~cept;iol18 to Rulc-Pedigree.-Decl:ll'aa deceased person that he was dh'orced from his widow and that she was ht'! "cx-wife," nre admissible exception to the 'hearsay rule. (Code Ch'. Prue., 16 Cal.Jur. 928, 934; 35 Am.Jur. 306, 315. .. 10 CaLJur.ll06j Amy Edith Smith, respondent, filed a claim against the estate alleging that she is the wido\v of the testator. She claims that she is entitled to two-thirds of the estate on the ground that charitable bequests under section 41 of the Probate Code may not collectively exceed· one-third of the estate as against the spouse of the decedent.
It is undisputed that respondent married the testator in January, 1926, and that they lived together until 1932 or 1933. It is also undisputed that in November, 1938, respondent entered into a marriage ceremony with Ralph N. Nichols, with whom she lived until May 13, 1945. After evidence was introduced relating to the marital status of respondent, the probate court found that respondent was the widow of the testator, and entered a decree of distribution, ordering that two-thirds of the residue of the estate be distributed to her. After completion of the hearing in the probate proceedinltS but before the entry of the decree, Ralph N. Nichols, who had previously commenced a divorce action against respondent, filed an amended complaint, in which he requested an annulment on the ground that at the time of respondent's marriage to him she was married to the testator. Neither Nichols nor respondent testified in the annulment proceeding, which was held five days after the entry of the decree of distribution in the probate proceeding. Counsel for Nichols introduced the record of the decree, whereupon the annulment was granted. .\sol:a:te presumption against the continuance of the life of to a marriage, in order to establish the innocence other party to a subsequent marriage; much less can ,a rigid presumption of a dissolution of the first U'l'lU'e·· by divorce, in order to make out such innocence. . . . particular case, -the -question-must be determined, like question of Ifact, upon a consideration of the attend. and circumstances, and such inferences as fairly and _':-,," __ ... ,"' " The question, therefore, is whether there was sub. Ml~1tUU· evidence to support the finding of the probate court ~llati'resP<l,ndent was the wife of the testator at the time of his , Respondent testified that before her marriage to Nichols she and Nichols visited the testator in a town near [t;';Ca:l,ifc~rn:ia; that the testator informed her that he had . a divorce and that the divorce papers were in his ae]iK>S_lt, box. Respondent entered into a marriage cere.
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[33 C.2d mont'Y with Nichols in reliance upon this information. Re. spondent further testified that after the death of the testator she made investigations in San Francisco, where she supposed that he had resided, and in Los Angeles, where she and the testator were married, but was unable to find any record of a divorce dissolviJlg their marriage; she made similar investiations in Lake County, where the testator maintained a place for camping, and~n Reno, Nevada, but no record of a divorce was discovered. Counsel for the executor stated that he had "examined the divorce records of a number of counties," but was unable to find any record of divorce in an action involving respondent and the testator. After the probate court had granted a continuance for the purpose of permitting further search, counsel for appellant made an investigation of divorce records in California. He stated that he had received reports from 56 of the 58 counties of the state, showing uo record of a divorce between respondent and the testator. Respondent testified that she did not receive any divorce papers or any notice of a divorce action from the testator. Although this testimony may not in itself be sufficient, it is persuasive when considered with other evidence that respondent's marriage to the testator had not been dissolved by divorce.
The trial court could reasonably infer that had an annulment been secured the existence of such a decree would have been discovered in the search of records of the various counties of the state. Moreover, the provision in the will by which the testator bequeathed $5.00 "to my wife" precludes the conclusion that he had secured either a divorce or an annulment from rE'spondent. Since there is no evidence that the tegtator had married again, the probate court could rCilson~ ubly infer that he was referring to respondent by that provision.
[3] Appell811t contends that it was error for the probate ('(lurt to exclude certain oral declarations of the testator. /\. ppellant made an offer of proof to show by the testimony of three disinterested witnesses, who were close frit'nds of -the .. 'stator living in San Francisco, that the testator had mnde f?peated statements· that he was divorced from respondent :lnd that she was his "ex-wife. In further support of appellant's position herein, and of the conclusion reached by the District Court of Appeal, it may be pointed out that for aught that is shown in the record the testator, a sea captain, may and mud be presumed to have secured a decree of divorce in some domestic or foreign jurisdiction, the validity of which decree respondent, by virtue of her subsequent marriage to Nichols,is now estopped to deny 10 attack the diflorce has remarried. When that circumstance is shown, as it is here, if there has been a divorce in any jurisdiction its effect cannot be challenged by a former .spouse who has accepted its benefits and remarried.
The presumption of innocence of crime is one of the strongest disputable presumptions known to the law. (See discussion and authorities cited, infra.) As stated by Justice Peters (p. 94 of 193 P.2d), "even if there is 'some' evidence that might be interpreted to be contrary to the presumption, it must be conceded that such evidence is very weak indeed. This being . , anyl~rror in excluding evidence that might support the presumption takes on added significance. There ean he no doubt that the trial court committed error in excluding the declarations of decedent made to intimate acquaintances on numerous occasions that he was divorced from respondent, and that she was his 'ex-wife' .
•. Respondent concedes, as she must, that it was error to have excluded these declarations of relationship [see Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(4) ; Estate of Morgan-(1928), 203 Cal. 569 [265 P. 241} ; Estate of Friedman (1918), 178 CnI. 27 [172 P. 140J; Estate of Strong (1942), 54 Cal.App.2d 604 [129 P.2d 493) ], but contends that such error was not prejudicial because respondent had admitted that decc.>dent had declared to her that he had secured a divorce and 'no amonnt of additional evidence to the same effect could do her so much daml\ie as her own testi-;; J IPL 1949 J E~TATE OP·SMITB (33 C.2d 279; 201,t~2d ~J 
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"monyon that sUbject. ' (Res. Br., :p. 6.) In other words, the respondent contends that the rejc~ted testimony was merely " cumulative, and that its rejection; was not prejudicinl. This , is au unrealistic approach to the question ... [T]hc probate I: judie seemed to be of the opinion:that the burden to show a " divorce rested upon appellant. and seemed to feel that that "burden could only be met by record evidence of a divorce. ~i In both assumptions the trial judge was wrong. Moreover, ~this respondent had to offer some reasou for marrying Nichols, ~'C)therwise she would be guilty of deliberate bi~amy. Smith was ftnot here to deny her statements .. Nichols, although present ~St the conversation, ,was not produced nor was his absence ~UpJained before the probate court. To say the least, the P\'Vidence as to whether there was or was not a divorce from j;!Smith was most tenuous and uncertain, with a strong prelriitmption that a divorce had been secured. Thus, to have ~exe1uded the decedent's own statements on this subject made f~'to several persons on many occasions was ob,iously error of ' ~\ most prejudicial nature. "
~t That the burden was on respondent to prove the illegality <!o' bf her marriage to Nichols tberecan be no question. As pre-:''';''rit\",. Tbere is also ana a very strong one, in favor of tbe legality marriage regularly solemnized. Rather than bold a Fitliil.iad marriage invalid and that' the parties have committed ....",c.,..-'---or been guilty of immorality, the courts bave often in the presumption of death in less tban seven Irj'ears. or, where the absent party was shown to be alive, bave ~allo,ved a presumption that the absent party has procured a A more correct statemetlt perbaps would be that burden is east upon the pariy asserting guilt or immorality the negative-that the first marriage had not ended the second marriage. " IWInJUnU'~n1; bere, in order to meet the burden of proving bi5!~mlY of whicb sbe asserts she is guilty, relied in tbe court solely upon the fact that the testator in his will left $5.00 "to my wife," and upon testimony that no record had been found of a Reno divorce or of any California divorce proceedings between the parties, although search had been made in Reno and in all California counties except two. Despite the total lack of evidence that the parties had not been divorced elsewhere, and despite respondent's testimony that the testator had declared to her that a divorce had been procured by him, that service had been accomplished by publication, that he had at that time a copy of the decree in 8 safety deposit bot, and that she was free to marry Nichols -:-a declaration which she accepted and upon which she acted until such time as she discovered that the testator had died leaving a substantial estate--the probate court found that she is the testator's widow. This reliance upon the words "to my wife" as the basis for the finding that respondent is the widow of decedent serves but to aggravate the prejudicial effect of the error in excluding the decedent's repeated declarations that ~ewas his "ex~wife:'''----' _ . .
---
The portion of the judgment appealed from should be reversed.
